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ABSTRACT
Attacks against the control processor of a power-grid system, espe-
cially zero-day attacks, can be catastrophic. Earlier detection of the
attacks can prevent further damage. However, detecting zero-day
attacks can be challenging because they have no known code and
have unknown behavior.
In order to address the zero-day attack problem, we propose a
data-driven defense by training a temporal deep learning model,
using only normal data from legitimate processes that run daily
in these power-grid systems, to model the normal behavior of the
power-grid controller. Then, we can quickly find malicious codes
running on the processor, by estimating deviations from the normal
behavior with a statistical test. Experimental results on a real power-
grid controller show that we can detect anomalous behavior with
over 99.9% accuracy and nearly zero false positives.
1 INTRODUCTION
The power-grid is a critical infrastructure, and attacks on it can crip-
ple society, affecting national security, economic competitiveness
and societal interactions. In 2015, Ukraine experienced cyber attacks
against its power-grid system [2]. During this attack, 30 substa-
tions were switched off and 230 thousand people were left without
electricity. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) ques-
tioned the current adequacy of defenses against power-grid attacks,
and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
has recognized these concerns [44]. With power-grid substations
controllable through cyberspace transactions, the concern about
cyber attacks on the physical power-grid systems is a real and seri-
ous threat, which is the focus of our paper. Although these attacks
can have disastrous impact, they are still an unsolved problem.
Previous work on the cyber-security of power-grid systems focus
on protecting the networks and data transmission. Wang [55] pro-
posed a secure wireless communication architecture in the power-
grid stations. Fouda [15] proposed an authentication scheme for
communications in the context of a power-grid system. Sikdar [41]
protected the anonymity of data to defend against the power-grid
traffic analysis attacks. Zhang [58] used SVM at different levels of
the power-grid system to detect network anomalies in a power-grid
system. Each of these solved a specific loophole of secure commu-
nication in the power-grid system, but can hardly guarantee the
detection of new attacks.
There have been other detection approaches proposed to protect
the power-grid system by examining the physical sensors. Manand-
har [31] used Kalman filters to model the voltage sensors and χ2
test to detect physical anomalies in the power-grid system. How-
ever, their model assumed simple sine wave inputs which cannot
be extended to a broader scope of sensor readings. In addition,
the electrical sensor readings could be spoofed by the adversary
[25]. Valenzuela [50] used Principle Component Analysis (PCA)
and irregular-space analysis to detect anomalies in the power-grid.
However, they may have oversimplified the problem by assuming
the anomalies lie in a subspace of the input data space. Cardenas [9]
suggested using linear models and threshold random walk (TRW)
to deal with the unseen attacks. However, their proposed linear
models are too simple to reflect the real complex physical processes.
Zhao [59] proposed an expert system with Hidden Semi-Markov
model. Their system requires the interaction between experts, thus
it could be biased by the human experience of the known attacks.
Besides networks and sensors, protecting the control code run-
ning on the industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs) is
an essential and fundamental task in protecting the power-grid
systems. No matter how the adversary spreads the malware or bad
programs through system vulnerabilities, his ultimate goal is taking
control of the power-grid infrastructures, destroying them or turn-
ing them off, and thus inducing huge physical impact. This attack
strategy has been shown in the Stuxnet [26] and BlackEnergy [2]
attacks. Earlier detection of the anomalous controller behavior lead-
ing to an attack can be helpful in preventing further severe impact
or damage. Therefore, rather than physical attacks on the physi-
cal power-grid system, we consider cyber attacks that hijack the
controller code that controls the actuators of the physical system.
However, it is challenging to protect the controller in the power-
grid system because ① there is no prior-knowledge about the at-
tacks, especially in the realistic "zero-day" attack settings. Labeled
attack data are highly sensitive and not available for training. ②
Various controllers, e.g. ABB, Mitsubishi, Siemens and Wago, and
OS, e.g. Windows, Unix and proprietary OS (SIMATIC WinCC),
are widely used in modern power-grid systems, exposing a large
attack surface. ③ The power-grid systems usually implement weak
anti-virus and integrity checking mechanisms on both executed
code and transferred data, due to the computation capacity and
hard-realtime constraints [22]. For example, runtime code integrity
checking [39, 40] cannot be directly applied to power-grid systems,
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because of the high overhead in a real-time system. ④Many con-
current threads are running on the power-grid controller simulta-
neously. Stealthy attack programs that have infected the controller
can hide within these threads. Dolgikh [13] proposed customized
normalcy profiles for programs in the power-grid systems, but they
assumed that there are only limited applications running in the
system.
In this paper, we propose a new data-driven methodology to
detect zero-day controller hijacking attacks on power-grid sys-
tems. Our proposed defense provides comprehensive and reliable
protection against unknown attacks. It does not look for specific
attacks or triggers, but rather a holistic view of controller opera-
tion, thus it can catch a broad scope of anomalies. Specifically, our
proposed approach first automatically learns the normal behavior
of the controller using temporal deep learning, and generates a
corresponding behavioral model of the controller. Then we use the
generated model, enhanced by an effective statistical test to detect
the deviation from processor normal behavior through reconstruc-
tion error distribution. Earlier detection of the anomalous controller
behavior can help quick mitigation and recovery from the attack,
for example, switching to a safe but not up-to-date version of the
control code.
Our main contributions in this paper are:
• We observe that the controller behavior in the power-grid
systems are predictable to some degree, because the hard-
realtime control events come up in a periodic way. This
observation is verified through a large-scale experiment on
a real controller.
• We propose a new data-driven, learning-based, statistically-
enhanced approach for detecting anomalies in the power-
grid controllers. Intuitively, this defense predicts the future
behavior of the controller through a well-trained deep tem-
poral model, and investigates the reconstruction error dis-
tribution. No prior-knowledge of attacks is needed in either
the training or inference, thus the proposed defense can be
used to detect zero-day attacks.
• We evaluate our proposed defense on real power-grid con-
trollers, by simulating the publicly reported attack function-
alities [11, 26]. We achieve over 99.9% accuracy with nearly
zero false positives. We also compare it with 11 conventional
anomaly detection approaches to show the superiority of
our proposed solution.
In Section 2, we provide background on the power-grid system,
Program Logic Controllers (PLCs), hardware performance counters
features and statistical test we use in our defense. In Section 3, we
articulate our threat model. In Section 4, we present our detection
methodology in detail. In Section 5, we present the experimental
results and discussion. We discuss related work in Section 6 and
conclude in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Architecture and Vulnerability of
Power-Grid Systems
Figure 1 shows a SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acqui-
sition) system controlling a power-grid [3]. While the rest of the
SCADA network and components are similar to general informa-
tion processing systems, the power-plant substations are the cyber-
physical systems we focus on. The key components in these sub-
stations are physical sensors (e.g. voltage, current), actuators (e.g.
relays, valves) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The PLC
obtains inputs from the sensors, and outputs control signals to
the actuators according to its control logic or control code. The
substations are connected through local networks.
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Figure 1: A diagram of a power-grid system [5]. Attacks can
happen in ① sensors, ② actuators, ③ controllers and ④ net-
works.
Attacks against the power-grid system can happen in any of
the components [23], i.e. sensors, actuators, controllers and the
interconnected networks illustrated in Figure 1. Attacks against
the physical actuators or sensors usually require physical accesses
to the devices, and are not in the scope of this paper. The ultimate
goal of the network attacks against the power-grid is launching the
malware, compromising the controller and inducing physical dam-
age. Hence, we focus on the detection of the controller’s abnormal
behavior in our study of cyber attacks on the power-grid.
2.2 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)
A programmable logic controller (PLC) is a digital device, equipped
with microprocessors, which is widely used as the controller in a
power-grid subsystem. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of a PLC
[1]. A PLC is composed of several subsystems, e.g. CPU, internal
memory, power subsystem and digital-to-analog converter. A PLC
can take physical sensor (and other) inputs from the target industrial
devices, make decisions and send commands to control a large range
of electrical devices and actuators.
The PLC used in our experiments is a Wago PLC with ARM
Cortex A8 processors. A custom real-time Linux OS runs on this
PLC. This PLC is widely used as the controller in a power-grid
system. We would like to monitor and predict the PLC behavior
through hardware performance counters to detect possible attacks
against the power grid system.
2.3 Hardware Performance Counters
In this work, we use low-level hardware events to monitor the
controller behavior. Controller hardware events, such as the num-
ber of executed instructions, cache operations and exceptions, are
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Figure 2: Programmable logic controller block diagram [1]
automatically and securely counted and stored in Hardware Perfor-
mance Counters (HPC) – a set of special-purpose registers. HPCs
are now widely available in commodity processors, e.g., Intel, ARM
and PowerPC. Detailed discussion on the availability of HPCs on
modern processors is given in Appendix A.
Hardware performance counters provide high tamper-resistance
and a low-cost way to monitor the controller behavior. First, un-
like anti-virus software, HPCs are hardware that cannot be di-
rectly accessed and modified by malware [52]. This characteristic
of HPCs significantly increases the tamper-resistance property. Sec-
ond, HPCs automatically record the hardware events, requiring
no extra logging or recording. Reading from HPCs is more effi-
cient than hashing the whole control code, making it low-cost with
negligible overhead.
Previous work has revealed the feasibility of using HPCs for
detecting malware [7, 12, 36, 37], firmware-modification [54] and
kernel root-kit [43, 53]. The key assumption of these detection
techniques is that the behavior of programs can be captured and
characterized with the occurrences of certain hardware events. We
present a temporal deep learning method to model the controller
behavior differences through the low-level HPCmicro-architectural
events.
2.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test) is a nonparametric test of
one-dimensional probability distributions. It can be used to distin-
guish if two sets of samples are from the same distribution. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for two sets with n andm samples
is:
Dm,n = supx |Fn (x) − Fm (x)| (1)
where Fn and Fm are the empirical distribution functions of two
sets of samples respectively, i.e. Fn (t) = 1n
∑n
i=1 1xi ≤t . sup is the
supremum function. Figure 3 illustrates the statistic Dm,n [6]. The
red and blue lines are the two empirical distributions of the two
sets. The black arrow is the two-sample KS test statistic Dm,n . The
x-axis is the cumulative threshold and the y-axis is the cumulative
probability. The null hypothesis that the two sets of samples are
i.i.d. sampled from the same distribution, is rejected at level α if:
Dn,m > c(α)
√
n +m
nm
(2)
where c(α) is a pre-calculated value and can be found in the standard
KS test lookup table.
Figure 3: Illustration of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic Dm,n
[6]
3 THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we consider cyber attacks that hijack the controller
code that controls the actuators of the physical system. We protect
the integrity of the control code running on a power-grid controller.
We do not explicitly consider the attacks against networks in power-
grid systems, because the ultimate goal of the network attacks is
corrupting the controller, which has been shown in the Stuxnet [26]
and BlackEnergy [2] attacks. Thus these attacks can be detected if
we can detect the controller’s anomalous behavior. We highlight
key points of our threat model in detail:
Our threat model specifically includes zero-day attacks. We
assume that there is no prior-knowledge of attack code, and the
way the adversary hijacks the controller. We only assume the goal
of the attacker is to take control of the hijacked controller to run
unauthorized code on the controller. Note that we do not make any
assumptions about the type of the unauthorized code, i.e. it can
be malicious control logic, worms, trojans or spyware, etc. There-
fore, though not explicitly targeted, availability and confidentiality
breaches are also included in our threat model. Furthermore, we
assume the normal behavior of the controller can be collected in a
clean environment and used for training a deep learning model. We
assume that the collection of performance data from the normal
operation of the PLC is readily available, e.g., through the built-in
hardware performance counters.
Attacker Capabilities. We consider an active attacker who can
hijack the controller code, add to, delete ormodify the programs run-
ning on the controller, by exploiting system security design holes.
Consequences of the attacks include controller failures, incorrect
outputs to the controlled physical actuators and other subsystems.
We assume the attacker can either access the victim system re-
motely (e.g. network or Botnet) or physically (e.g. USB). The attack
code can be polymorphic and stealthy.
Target Systems. We consider a power-grid system in our threat
model. First, we assume the power-grid system implements weak
anti-virus and integrity checking mechanisms on both executed
code and transferred data, due to the computation capacity and
hard-realtime constraints [22]. Second, we assume the low-level
hardware performance counters are accessible and trusted. This
assumption is reasonable because hardware registers are harder to
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tamperwith. Third, the target system is relatively stable, i.e. the code
running on the controller changes infrequently. This assumption is
reasonable because the control processes, once downloaded to the
controller, usually are not updated very often [27].
4 OUR DETECTION METHODOLOGY
4.1 Overview
We consider the attack scenario in which the attacker breaches the
integrity of the control code and causes the controller to function
incorrectly in the power-grid system. Our key idea is, the normal
behavior of the controller in a power-grid system is predictable
using a temporal deep learning model and tamper-resistant HPC
features. The deviation of the real monitored behavior from the
predicted behavior indicates the anomalies in the controller. We
further use a statistical test to determine the occurrence of such de-
viation, and consider that as abnormal controller behavior. We show
an overview of the workflow of our proposed method in Figure
4. There are four steps in the hijacking detection. We use "base-
line" and "normal", "real observed sequence" and "testing sequence"
interchangeably.
(1) Training a deep sequence predictor to predict baseline con-
troller behaviors in the future. The sequence predictors used
in this paper are LSTM and Conditional-RBM.
(2) Calculating the baseline reconstruction error distribution D1
as the reference distribution. In our experiments, we use the
squared error of the predicted behavior v1 and the observed
behavior v2, i.e. |v1 −v2 |2, as the reconstruction error.
(3) Using the sequence predictor online to predict the future
behavior using the historical behavior. Calculating the re-
construction error distribution D2 of the observed (testing)
behavior which can be normal or abnormal.
(4) Applying the KS test on D1 and D2 to determine if they are
from the same distribution.
We show our proposed system design in Figure 5. It consists
of several components: a deep learning accelerator and an HPC
interface [35] for predicting the normal behavior of the controller,
an external RAM for storing the reference "gold values", a KS test
module and an anomaly response module, e.g. a code version con-
troller. The deep learning module reads the HPC measurements in
real-time and computes the testing reconstruction errors. The KS
test module receives the testing and reference reconstruction errors,
from the deep learning module and the external RAM, respectively.
The positive KS test result (two sets of reconstruction errors with
different distributions) triggers the code version controller to switch
to a "safe but not updated" version of the control code [34].
Next, we address the challenges and concerns in designing an
effective protection for power-grid controllers.
Capturinghigh-level controller behaviorwith low-levelHPC
features. Although using HPC measurements benefits from the
low-cost and high tamper-resistant properties, it is challenging
to appropriately capture and characterize high-level controller be-
havior from the low-level hardware events. Conventional machine
learning or clustering based anomaly detection approaches require
carefully designed heuristic features, however, high-level semantic
features are typically hard to handcraft from low-level measure-
ments.
To address this concern, first, we observe that the functionality
of control programs in a power-grid system are more periodic and
stable than general-purpose systems. This feature eases the model-
ing of program behavior. Second, we use temporal deep learning to
automatically characterize the behavior of the controller from low-
level HPCmeasurements. Temporal deep learning models, e.g. Long
Short-TermMemory (LSTM), have been shown to be able to capture
the semantic features from low-level measurements in other fields,
e.g natural language processing (NLP) [20, 51, 57], video [45, 60]
and speech analysis [18, 32]. For this reason, we believe the deep
learning model can also capture the behaviors in the power-grid
systems, and thus is able to detect anomalous controller behavior.
Predictability of the controller behavior. A mild level of pre-
dictability of the controller is sufficient for our defense. The "accu-
rate prediction" of the controller’s behavior is not necessary, since
we are looking for the difference between the prediction error distri-
butions. We do not expect nearly zero prediction errors for normal
behavior (accurate prediction), but we would like the prediction er-
rors of normal/abnormal behavior to be different. We show that this
mild level of predictability is achievable in the power-grid system
in Section 4.2 through our experiments.
Concurrent threads. PLCs in a power-grid system can have con-
current threads with dependencies among the threads. Therefore, to
provide comprehensive protection, we have to monitor all threads
running on the controller. Typically, there are fewer threads ( 10-
100) running on the power-grid controller than a general-purpose
system, making it possible and low-cost to monitor all threads.
Hardware events selection. Hundreds of architectural andmicro-
architectural hardware events are available in mainstream proces-
sors. However, not all HPC measurements are equally good for
power-grid controller anomaly detection. The properties of good
hardware events include ① sensitivity to code changes, ② stability
from one execution to another, ③ wide availability in all proces-
sors. We select four candidate HPCs for each thread based on these
criteria: ① the number of cycles and ② the number of instructions
executed for each thread, to provide the overall running status of
the thread. ③ The number of L1 cache misses for each thread, to
reflect the locality and temporal properties of data usage. ④ The
number of branch instructions for each thread, to show the changes
in the control flow of the threads.
Polymorphic and stealthy attacks. To bypass the static mal-
ware analysis, the adversary can write code variants that are func-
tionally equivalent (polymorphic codes). However, our detection
characterizes the program by its functionality and behavior. No
matter how the adversary changes his code, the malicious func-
tionalities of the malware always exist. A similar situation occurs
for stealthy attacks, where the attacker tries to hide by prolong-
ing the time-span or mimicking the normal behavior. Therefore,
the accumulated suspiciousness in a long time-span can still be
captured through temporal deep learning, because it can adjust its
monitoring window automatically and capture the accumulated
deviations. In addition, we comprehensively monitor all threads
on the processor, significantly raising the bar for the adversary to
create code mimicking all threads on the controller.
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system. It consists of an interface betweenHPCand the deep
learning accelerator [35], an external RAM storing the ref-
erence "gold values", a KS test module and an anomaly re-
sponse module, e.g. shown here as a code version controller.
4.2 Controller Behavior Prediction with Deep
Temporal Models
Model training. The first step is training a temporal deep learn-
ing model to predict the controller’s future behavior based on its
historical behavior, illustrated as ① in Figure 4.
In the training, we first collect a set of sequences of the controller
behavior measurement {Si }Ni=1, which are HPC measurements in
our scenario, in the clean environment. N is the number of total
sequences. Each sequence Si consists of T continuous behavior
measurements, i.e. Si = [S1i , S2i , ..., STi ]. In our experiments, each
behavior measurement Sti is a vector consisting of 4 HPC readings
for 23 threads, i.e. a vector of dimension 4*23=92. At time t , the deep
learning model predicts St+1i using behavior history [S1i , ..., Sti ].
We denote this prediction as Ot+1i . The loss function is defined as
the accumulated prediction errors, i.e.
loss =
1
N
1
T − 1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
(Sti −Oti )2 (3)
Intuitively, since {Si }Ni=1 are normal behavior collected in the
clean environment, the loss penalizes the incorrect prediction of
normal behavior. We train this model to minimize the loss function
with Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD).
To justify our observation that the controller behavior in a power-
grid system is predictable, we collect 300,000 samples from 4 HPC
readings of 23 threads on a real power-grid system that runs every
day. We find 40 HPC values for specific threads are always zeros,
thus we exclude these HPC values and train an LSTM to predict
the controller behavior regarding the remaining HPCs. We use
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) as our metric of predictability. Without
handcrafting features, we achieve an average SNR = 12.68 dB.
Note that random guesses (if controller behavior is non-predictable)
result in an SNR value very close to −∞. This observation indicates
that the controller behavior is predictable, with respect to the HPCs,
to a mild degree, in the power-grid system.
Reconstruction error distribution profiling. After training the
model, we profile the normal behavior in terms of reconstruction er-
ror distribution, illustrated as② in Figure 4. First, a longer reference
sequence of controller behavior measurement, R = [R1, R2, ...,RT ′],
is collected in the clean environment. Note that R is another se-
quence rather than previous Si , consisting of T ′ time frames. Each
time frame Ri is a vector of dimension 4*23=92 in our experiment.
Second, at time frame t , we use the trained model to predict time
frame t + 1, t + 2,...,t + L using the corresponding history behavior.
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We denote the prediction as Ot+1, ...,Ot+L respectively. The re-
construction error is defined as the accumulated prediction errors,
i.e.
E(t) =
t+L∑
i=t+1
(Ri −Oi )2 (4)
We define the distribution of E(1), E(2), E(3)... as the reconstruc-
tion error distribution. Using the reconstruction error distribu-
tion as the profile has several advantages.① It is more robust to the
noise in the measurement, because noise makes a single prediction
error vary significantly but the distribution remains stable. ② It
simplifies the model learning process. Since we profile the error
distributions, we no longer need to train a "perfect" predictor. ③ It
broadens the scope of target systems by decreasing the required
level of predictability. By using reconstruction errors, we allow
the existence of imprecisions in the prediction. Thus it reduces the
required predictability of the system to a mild level.
In the profiling, collections of the reference reconstruction error
distribution are required to be gathered in a clean environment.
This can be done by collecting the HPC sequences immediately af-
ter a trusted version of control code is uploaded. The gathered HPC
sequences are sent to the trained deep learning module to calculate
the reference reconstruction errors. These offline reconstruction
errors are then stored in a separate RAM partition, and used as
the references in the online detection. To better represent the re-
construction error distribution by the empirical samples, multiple
reference reconstruction errors can be generated and compared
with the observed reconstruction errors in the online detection
phase.
Model selection. Among the deep learning models, Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) and its variation Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) [21] have become the most powerful ones in modeling
sequential data. They achieve significant successes in sequential
data processing [19, 47]. An LSTM cell has three gates that control
information flow: the forget gate, the input gate and the output
gate. The forget gate controls the amount of previous information
remaining in the cell memory. The input gate controls the amount
of new information flowing to the cell memory, and the output gate
controls the amount of information flowing to the output. Thus,
LSTM automatically determines what information to "remember"
and "forget". Details of LSTM are given in Appendix B.
The Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is another generative
neural network which can learn a probability distribution. RBMs
are shallow, two-layer neural nets i.e. one visible layer and one
invisible layer. Each visible node takes a low-level feature (e.g. HPC
values in the context of a power-grid system) from a sample in
the dataset to be learned. Each invisible node represents a high-
level learned feature (e.g. controller behavior in the context of a
power-grid system). However, the vanilla RBM does not capture the
temporal information, therefore in this work, we leverage a variant
of RBM which considers historical information, i.e. Conditional-
RBM (CRBM). The detailed structures of RBM and CRBM are given
in Appendix B.
Figure 6: A real histogram example of the reconstruction er-
ror distributions of ① reference baseline behavior (blue), ②
testing normal behavior (orange) and③ testing abnormal be-
havior (red). We observe that the distributions of reference
(blue) and testing normal (orange) behavior are very similar,
but distinct from the distribution of abnormal (red) behav-
ior.
We use either LSTM or Conditional-RBM as our predictors of
the controller behavior, enhanced by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistical test (Section 4.4).
Model evolution. To accommodate the legitimate controller be-
havior drift, e.g. an update of the control code, the deep learning
model needs to be retrained or fine-tuned online. Note that either
in the initial training or online fine-tuning, the deep learning model
must be trained with HPC measurements from a clean (no attack)
environment. Otherwise, the trained model cannot predict the nor-
mal behavior correctly.
4.3 Online Hijacking Detection
The online hijacking detection is illustrated as step ③ and ④ in
Figure 4. The controller behavior, in terms of HPCs, is dynamically
monitored at runtime. Similar to the offline profiling phase, the
gathered HPC sequences are sent to the deep learning module
for prediction. The same form (Eq. 4) of reconstruction errors are
calculated and sent to the KS test module, along with the reference
reconstruction errors gathered in the offline phase.
We show a histogram example of the reconstruction error dis-
tributions in Figure 6. The blue histogram shows the reference
reconstruction error distribution gathered in the offline profiling.
The orange/red histograms show the testing normal/abnormal re-
construction error distribution, respectively. The blue distribution
(reference) is very similar to the orange distribution (testing nor-
mal), but very distinct from the red distribution (testing abnormal).
In addition, the blue and orange distributions mainly concentrate at
the low-end (small errors), justifying our observation that the deep
learning model can predict the normal behavior of the processor,
even with small behavior deviations.
All the computation of deep learning prediction and reconstruc-
tion errors are performed outside the controller, on a trusted GPU
or deep learning accelerator, because if the controller is hijacked,
the results computed by it cannot be trusted.
Our detection system can be integrated with different mitiga-
tion approaches. For example, after a controller hijacking attack
is detected, an alarm is sent out. Another mitigation response is
switching to a "safe version" of controller code in a ROM, which
may not be up-to-date but is free from attack. Other responses are
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possible, such as controlling the actuator settings, while checking
that an attack has actually occurred rather than a false alarm.
4.4 Statistical Test for Reconstruction Error
Distributions
We now address the problem: how to effectively determine anoma-
lous behavior from the reconstruction errors?
Problems with Hard Thresholds and Gaussian Assumptions.
Previouswork [30] [29] assume amultivariate Gaussian distribution
and set a hard threshold for the reconstruction errors, e.g. mean +
3 * standard deviations (or best on the validation set), to detect the
anomalies. However, we find that the Gaussian assumption does
not correctly reflect the reconstruction error distributions of the
predicted processor behavior. Figure 6 illustrates the "one-sided
long-tail" characteristic of error distribution, which clearly differs
from the Gaussian distribution. Besides, we find that the threshold
value significantly affects the accuracy and relies highly on the split
of the validation set, making it not stable nor reliable.
Figure 7 illustrates the detection using a hard threshold, i.e. mean
+ 3 * std on the validation set. The top figure (a) shows the raw recon-
struction error for normal behavior (left half, time frame t=0-12000)
and attacks (right half, time frame t=12000-24000). Note that the
separation of normal behavior and attacks is only for clearer illus-
tration, real monitoring results can be an arbitrary random mixture
of normal behavior and attacks. We observe that the reconstruction
errors on the right (attacks) are generally larger than the recon-
struction errors on the left (normal behavior). A hard threshold of
mean + 3 * std on the validation set is shown as the red horizontal
line in Figure 7 (a). Figure 7 (b) shows the detection results, where
"1"s represent the time frames recognized as abnormal, and "0"s
represent the time frames recognized as normal. We observe that
such a hard threshold induces significant false positives and false
negatives.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Anomaly Detection. Hence,
we propose a new approach for detecting anomalies from the recon-
struction errors, without the Gaussian assumptions. We propose us-
ing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine if the reconstructed
error distribution is the same distribution as the reference error
distribution (Section 4.2). Suppose the reference reconstruction er-
ror distribution is D1 and the reconstruction error distribution on
the questioned sequence is D2. We sample n andm independent
samples from the two distributions, respectively. We calculate the
KS test statistic, i.e., Dm,n = supx |Fn (x) − Fm (x)|. Then we define
a significance level p for this test, i.e. the probability of detecting a
difference under the null hypothesis that samples are drawn from
the same distribution. We reject the null hypothesis, i.e., recognize
that the samples as anomalies, if the inequality in Eq (2) holds. The
KS test eliminates previous unrealistic Gaussian assumptions and
significantly improves the accuracy in our experiments.
4.5 Security Analysis
We now discuss the potential attacks and how they are defended
by our proposed solution.
Case 1: The attacker hides and waits for a specific time to
hijack the controller. If the attack code keeps silent, it does not
do any harm to the system. As long as the attack becomes active
and influences the behavior of the controller, our experiments show
that we can detect it in a short time and eliminate the damage to
the system. Note that our proposed method provides continuous
and holistic protection of the controller.
Case 2: The attacker tampers with the prediction and KS
test. If the deep learning prediction and KS test are computed on the
hijacked controller, the attacker can also compromise the detection
results. However, in our design, the prediction and KS test are done
entirely outside the controller.
Case 3: The attacker steals the reference reconstruction
samples. If the attacker obtains the reference samples, we claim
there is still no way to construct a code sequence to cheat our
system, because the deep learning module serves as a "black-box"
oracle to the attacker: he cannot reverse the input (HPC sequence)
from the output (reconstruction errors).
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1 Data Collection Setup and Metrics
We implement a prototype of our proposed defense system. Our
target system is a real power-grid controller sub-system, running
the real deployed power-grid controlling code. The control codes
are written in Structured Text (IEC 61131-3 standard), and run on
the PLC as a highly multi-threaded program (e.g., 23 threads as
I/O, controls, etc.). The 23 threads in the Wago PLC process being
monitored correspond to the main thread and 22 threads that they
spawn in the order described below. When the PLC powers on,
7 threads are created. When an application is loaded, another 15
threads will be killed and re-spawn with a different thread identifier
(TID). The last thread (PLC_Task) is the one specifically running
the loaded application (utilizing the other threads to do various
tasks). We list the threads and their start phase in Table 1.
Table 1: Threads running on Programmable Logic Con-
troller
Start Time Thread(s)
PLC powers on (7)
spi1, codesys3, com_DBUS_worker,
0ms_Watch_Thread, CAAEventTast,
SchedExeption, Schedule
When an application
is loaded (15)
WagoAsyncRtHigh, WagoAsyncRtMed,
WagoAsyncRtLow, WagoAsyncHigh,
WagoAsyncMed, WagoAsyncLow,
WagoAsyncBusCyc, WagoAsyncBusEvt,
WagoAsyncBusEvt, WagoAsyncBusEvt,
WagoAsyncBusEvt, ProcessorLoadWa,
KBUS_CYCLE_TASK, ModbusSlaveTCP,
PLC_Task
Main thread (1) Main
The HPCs are monitored on a real PLC with an ARM Cortex
A8 processor and custom real-time Linux distribution. Data from 4
HPCs was collected for each thread:
• Number of cycles executed, NC
• Number of instructions executed, NI
• Number of branches executed, NB
• Number of L1 cache misses, NL .
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(a) Reconstruction errors (green) and hard threshold, mean + 3 * std (red)
(b) Detection results using hard threshold
Truth: Normal Truth: Attacks
False positives False negatives
300
200
100
0
1
0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Figure 7: Detecting anomalies using hard threshold (mean + 3 * stddev). Time frame t=0-12000 show the reconstruction er-
ror of normal behavior (no attack), t=12000-24000 show the reconstruction error under attacks. (a) The raw reconstruction
errors (green) and hard threshold, mean + 3 * stddev. (b) Detection results using hard threshold, "0" is predicting normal, "1"
is predicting abnormal. We observe many false positives and false negatives with a hard threshold.
The total number of HPCs monitored is 4N if there are N threads.
However, as the monitored ARM processor has only 2 read ports,
only "NC and NL" or "NB and NI " are read simultaneously and then
switch. The HPCs are sampled at 1 kHz for each of the 23 threads.
The system was tested with six different real attacks in Table
2, that are known to cause damage to the power-grid. The attacks
include simulating the publicly reported malicious functionalities
of Stuxnet [26] and BlackEnergy [2], i.e. halting the controller and
replaying prerecorded inputs to the legitimate code. In addition,
we consider the other attacks against the input, output and control
logic of the processor, which are the key components of the control
code. We sample 300,000 samples for each attack running.
We define 6 important performance metrics below that we will
use in our experiments: accuracy, false positive rate, false negative
rate, precision, recall and F1 score. Precision measures the ratio of
true positives among all predicted positives. Recall measures the
ratio of detected positives among all real positives. The F1 score is
the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall, which balances these
two metrics. We show the values of the metrics in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
We will compare these results in detail in the following sections.
5.2 Effectiveness in Detecting Attacks
We first show that our enhanced deep learning approach is effective
in amplifying small changes of control logic code (e.g., small code
changes in Attacks 1-6) in the PLC to large KS statistics D. We show
three representative examples, Testing Normal (row 1), Attack 1
(row 2) and Attack 2 (row 3), in Figure 8. ① The left column shows
the reconstruction errors in the time domain. We observe that, in
general, the reconstruction errors of Attacks (red in the 2nd and
3rd row) are slightly larger than the testing normal scenario (green
in the 1st row). ② The middle column shows the histograms of the
reconstruction error distribution. We observe that the reconstruc-
tion error distribution of testing normals (green, row 1 middle) is
more similar to the reference distribution (blue, row 1 middle), than
the distribution of attacks (red, rows 2 and 3). ③ The right column
shows the KS test statistics D. We find that D is significantly larger
under the attacks (rows 2 and 3) than testing normal (row 1). This
gives us assurance that our enhanced deep learning method (LSTM
+ KS test) can indeed detect attacks which materialize as only small
code changes in the PLC in power-grid systems.
Reference
Testing 
Normal
Histogram of Reconstruction
Error Distribution
D
D
Reference
Attack 1
Reference
Attack 2
Reconstruction Error
in Time Domain
KS Test Statistics D
Figure 8: Effectiveness in detecting attacks. Left: LSTM re-
construction errors in the time domain for testing normal
behavior (row 1), Attack 1 (row 2) and Attack 2 (row 3). Mid-
dle: Histogram of reconstruction error distribution for Nor-
mal behavior, Attacks 1 and 2. Right: CDF of reconstruction
error distribution andKS statisticD for Normal behavior, At-
tacks 1 and 2. The KS statistic amplifies the differences in
the time domain in cases of attacks (second and third rows),
while remaining small in the case of normal behavior (row
1).
5.3 Results and Discussion
Anomaly Detection Comparison. We show the detection re-
sults of our proposed enhanced deep learning based approach,
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Table 2: Baseline and attacks against a power-grid PLC
Description Hijack Type
Baseline (Testing Normal) Baseline (a Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) controller) None
Attack 1 Overwrite the input (an additional line of code to overwrite the value of the input) Input hijack
Attack 2 Saturate the input (2 additional lines of code with IF condition on input value) Control flow hijack
Attack 3 Disable the PID control code (the entire PID block is commented out) Entire Code hijack
Attack 4 PID in "manual" mode (output is fixed) Output hijack
Attack 5 2 PIDs Cascaded (input of a PID controller is sent through a second PID controller) Control flow hijack
Attack 6 Overwrite the output (an additional line of code to overwrite the value of the output) Output hijack
and compare with 11 different conventional anomaly detection
approaches in Table 3. Note that all conventional anomaly detec-
tion approaches require heuristic features, while our approach takes
raw data as input. This significantly reduces the tedious feature de-
sign and extraction process. We fine-tune the hyper-parameters and
report the highest F1 score for the conventional anomaly detection
methods.
Our proposed deep temporal model based detection methods
(last 2 rows) achieve as high as 99.97% accuracy and 0.9997 F1 score
with no false negatives (all anomalies are detected) for the LSTM +
KS test approach. We observe that the deep temporal model based
detection approaches, especially LSTM, are better than all conven-
tional methods, in terms of accuracy and F1 score, in detecting
power-grid controller anomalies. Some approaches achieve slightly
lower false positive rates than CRBM+KS test, however, the false
negative rates are much higher and vice versa. Our proposed LSTM
and CRBM methods are better than conventional approaches be-
cause conventional detection methods are not able to automatically
extract inherent but complex features which can be used to model
the normal behaviors of the target power-grid controller. In ad-
dition, LSTM is superior to all conventional anomaly detection
approaches and CRBM, as it can automatically adjust the monitor-
ing window, while the conventional approaches and CRBM require
a fixed window size which could be highly biased.
Deep Learning Models Comparison. We investigate how the
types and architectures of the deep learning models affect the de-
tection results. First, we show the results of LSTM with different
numbers of hidden nodes and CRBM in Figure 9 (a). We observe
that the LSTMs perform better than the CRBM, because the LSTM
automatically adjusts the "memory window size" while CRBM uses
a fixed size. We also find that an LSTM with a medium number
(128) of nodes in the hidden layer performs better than an LSTM
with a small (5) or large (256) number of nodes in the hidden layer,
because too few nodes in the hidden layer significantly limit the
capability of the LSTM. The model can hardly represent the con-
troller behavior because of the low capacity. On the other hand,
an LSTM with too many nodes in the hidden layer causes another
problem – over-fitting. In this case, the LSTM model "memorizes"
the training samples and lacks generalization ability.
Next, we compare the training mechanisms of LSTMwith CRBM.
We provide the accuracy and false positive (FP) rate versus training
epochs in Figure 9 (b). We find that LSTM convergences faster
than CRBM, and achieves better final detection results. LSTM also
becomes stable at the end of the training, however, CRBM continues
to oscillate as we continue to train it. CRBM introduces uncertainty
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(a) Deep learning models (b) Training Mechanism
Figure 9: (a) Detection results of using different deep learn-
ing models as the predicting module. In general, LSTM per-
forms better than CRBM, regarding precision, recall and F1
score. The number of hidden nodes in LSTMdoes not signifi-
cantly affect the results, as long as not too few hidden nodes
(>5). (b) Training mechanism for LSTM and CRBM. LSTM
converges faster and achieves better ultimate accuracy than
CRBM.
in training because of its sampling step, making the training for
CRBM less stable than LSTM.
Hard Threshold and Statistical Test Comparison. We evalu-
ate the effectiveness and necessity of our statistical test. In Table
4, we compare the detection results with and without KS test. The
first 4 rows show the detection results of different LSTMs using
hard thresholds, while the next 4 rows show the corresponding
LSTM + KS test for comparison. We observe that the statistic test
improves all evaluated LSTM models. We observe that, without KS
test, the highest detection accuracy is 97.7% when 128 hidden nodes
are used. The accuracy rises to 99.98% using KS test. In general, the
KS test has three benefits:① It gets rid of the Gaussian assumptions
in the thresholding approaches (Elliptic Envelope), especially when
this Gaussian assumption does not hold in our usage scenarios.② It
provides insensitivity to the deep learning architectures (LSTM in
our experiment).③ It is not sensitive to the p-values in the scenario
of power-grid anomaly detection. The KS test gives us what we call
an enhanced deep learning method.
Significance Levels. Although we find that the final accuracy
is not sensitive to the p-value, it is still the one parameter we
should deal with carefully. Thresholds are generally very arbitrary
and highly dependent on the validation set and data distributions.
However, significance level p, a.k.a. p-value, is explainable and
indicates how incompatible the data are with the hypothesis. The
most widely used value is p = 0.05, which trades off between the
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Table 3: Anomaly detectionmethods on detecting zero-day attacks against a real ARMCortex A8 PLC controlling a real power-
grid. Our proposed deep learning + statistical test approach performs better than all evaluated methods.
Anomaly Detection Method Key Hyper-parameters Accuracy False Positive False Negative Precision Recall F1
One-Class SVM RBF Kernel, γ = 1Nf eatures 0.849 0.104 0.621 0.267 0.379 0.236
KNN Nneiдhbors = 5 0.930 0.000 0.766 1.000 0.235 0.380
PCA Ncomponents = 10 0.841 0.161 0.141 0.347 0.859 0.495
Exponential Moving Average Smoothing Factor = 0.2, Smooth Window = 20 0.911 0.000 0.982 0.994 0.018 0.127
Elliptic Envelope Estimation [38] Support Fraction = 1.0 0.867 0.146 0.000 0.406 1.000 0.578
Robust Elliptic Envelope estimation [42] Support Fraction = Nsamples+Nf eatures+12 0.928 0.079 0.000 0.559 1.000 0.717
Local Outlier Factor [8] Nneiдhbors = 20 0.929 0.000 0.783 1.000 0.218 0.357
Isolation Forrest [28] Ntr ees = 100 0.949 0.056 0.000 0.640 1.000 0.780
Bitmap Encoding [56] Sections = 4 0.911 0.001 0.968 0.799 0.032 0.061
HBOS [16] Nbins = 10, regularizer α = 0.1 0.899 0.111 0.001 0.473 0.999 0.642
Fast ABOS [24] Nneiдhbors = 5 0.929 0.000 0.784 1.000 0.216 0.355
CRBM + KS test (Proposed) Nhidden = 50 0.957 0.062 0.023 0.934 0.977 0.958
LSTM + KS test (Proposed) Nhidden = 256 0.9997 0.0005 0.000 0.9995 1.000 0.9997
Table 4: Effectiveness of combining deep learning models
and statistical KS test
Accuracy False Positive False Negative Precision Recall F1
LSTM(5) 0.935 0.028 0.103 0.970 0.897 0.932
LSTM(128) 0.977 0.028 0.017 0.972 0.983 0.977
LSTM(256) 0.976 0.041 0.007 0.960 0.993 0.976
LSTM(512) 0.976 0.041 0.007 0.960 0.993 0.976
LSTM(5) + KS 0.998 0.004 0.000 0.996 1.000 0.999
LSTM(128) + KS 0.9998 0.0004 0.000 0.9996 1.000 1.000
LSTM(256) + KS 0.9997 0.0005 0.000 0.9995 1.000 1.000
LSTM(512) + KS 0.9997 0.0005 0.000 0.9995 1.000 1.000
false positives and the false negatives. In general, a small p-value
decreases false positives but increases false negatives, and vice
versa. For a fair comparison, we report the results when p = 0.05
although we can achieve even better results with a smaller p.
From Table 3 and 5 we observe that our KS test based approaches
aremuch better in accuracy than all conventional hard-thresholding
approaches, except when the p-value=0.5, the accuracy is 0.947,
which is slightly lower than Isolation Forrest (0.949). Also, we ob-
serve that KS test based approaches are more robust regarding
p-values. For a broad range of p-values, the KS test gives good
results, in contrast to thresholding based approaches. In addition,
we find the KS test also makes the result not sensitive to differ-
ent architectures. We have tested LSTMs with 5, 128, 256 and 512
hidden nodes.
Table 5: Influence of Confidence Value p
Accuracy False Positive False Negative Precision Recall F1
p = 0.5 0.947 0.105 0.000 0.905 1.000 0.950
p = 0.2 0.993 0.013 0.000 0.987 1.000 0.993
p = 0.1 0.998 0.003 0.000 0.997 1.000 0.998
p = 0.05 0.999 0.001 0.000 0.999 1.000 0.999
p = 0.01 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
5.4 Latency Evaluation
In our prototype, we implement the LSTM on an Nvidia 1080Ti
GPU on a server. The server is equipped with 2 Intel Xeon E5-2667
2.90GHz CPUs, each with 6 cores. The level 1 instruction and data
caches are 32 KB, the level 2 cache is 256 KB and the level 3 cache
is 16MB. The OS we are using is Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS.
We list the training and inference times obtained with the above
setup in Table 6. Note that the training is typically done only once,
and needs to be repeated only if the functionality of the control
code for the PLC is modified. In each inference time period, we can
infer multiple PLC sequences in parallel. We can parallelize 256 PLC
sequences, the degree of parallelization depends on the GPU we
are running on. For each time frame, we need to predict 2000 time
stamps in the future and subsample it, to ensure the independence
required by KS test samples. Thus, the time taken to detect an attack
is 2 seconds (2000 / 1 kHz), i.e. if an attack happens at t seconds, it
can be discovered at t + 2 seconds as anomalous PLC behavior. In
a real implementation, a trusted deep learning accelerator can be
used (Figure 5), which will give faster execution time and greater
security through hardware isolation.
Table 6: Execution time for model training and inferenc-
ing, and KS testing, for detecting the controller hijacking
attacks.
Training Inference KS Test
LSTM 21.1 min 39.8 ms 8.63 ms
CRBM 3.5 min 265 ms 8.63 ms
6 RELATEDWORK
Past work have also proposed anomaly detections for power-grid
systems. Manandhar [31] used Kalman filters to model the voltage
sensors and χ2 test to detect physical anomalies in the power-grid
system. Valenzuela [50] proposed Principle Component Analysis
(PCA) based smart-grid attack detection approaches. Cardenas [9]
suggested using linear models and threshold randomwalk (TRW) to
deal with the unseen attacks. However, their proposed models may
be too simple to represent realistic power-grid systems. Mitchell
[33] set behavior rules for devices in the power-grid systems. Zhao
[59] proposed an expert system with Hidden Semi-Markov model.
Their system requires manually setting rules and the interaction
between experts, respectively. Thus they could be biased by the
human experience of the known attacks.
Previous defenses on cyber attacks on the power-grid systems
focused on network and data communication security. Wang [55]
protected the wireless communication in power-grid systems by
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proposing a secure wireless communication architecture. Fouda
[15] proposed an authentication scheme for communications in the
power-grid system. Sikdar [41] protected the anonymity of data to
defend against the power-grid traffic analysis attacks. Each of these
solved a specific loophole of secure communication in the power-
grid system, but can hardly guarantee the detection of new attacks.
Dolgikh [13] proposed customized normalcy profiles to protect the
power-grid systems. However, they both assumed that there are
only simple applications running in the system. Gonzalez [17] and
Stone [46] used power and Radio Frequency (RF) side channel to
detect the controller anomalies. However, the controller behavior
can hardly be accurately monitored through the side-channels.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to discuss using
deep learning on the low-level hardware features to automatically
learn the controller’s normal behavior, and provide a low-cost, high
tamper-resilience and comprehensive protection of the controller
in the power-grid system.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new data-driven methodology to de-
tect zero-day controller hijacking attacks on power-grid systems.
We observe the controller behavior in power-grid systems is pre-
dictable in terms of hardware performance counters, and verify
this using a large-scale experiment on a real power-grid controller
subsystem. Our method leverages deep temporal models, enhanced
with the statistical test. A key advantage of our method is that only
normal data is used, and no prior-knowledge about the attack data
is needed, thus enabling detection of zero-day attacks. We evaluate
our detection system on a real programmable logic controller with
an ARM Cortex A8 processor used in power-grid substations. We
show the significant improvement of using enhanced deep learn-
ing compared to 11 conventional anomaly detection approaches.
Experimental results show that our proposed system achieves over
99.9% accuracy with nearly zero false positives.
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APPENDIX
A. Availability of HPCs
HPCs have been widely implemented on most commodity proces-
sors, include Intel, ARM and PowerPC.
An Intel processor provides various CPU performance measure-
ments in real-time in HPCs. It supports not only "core", but also
"uncore", performance counters. Core refers to the processor, its
general-purpose registers and its private caches. Uncore refers to
the Level-2 (L2) or Level-3 (L3) cache shared between cores, the in-
tegrated memory controllers, and the Intel QuickPath Interconnect
to the other cores and shared system components and the I/O hub.
Examples of the core HPCs are the number of: instructions retired,
elapsed core clock ticks, L2 cache hits and misses, L3 cache misses
and hits, and the core frequency. Examples of the uncore HPCs are
the number of: bytes read from memory controller(s), bytes written
to the memory controller(s), and data traffic transferred by the Intel
QuickPath Interconnect links.
There are also many performance event counters provided by
an HPCs in an ARM processor. For example, the ARM Cortex-A
series processor provides about 30 performance events, including
the number of: Level-1 (L1) data cache refill events, or L1 instruc-
tion cache refill events, TLB (Translation Lookaside Buffer) refill
events, all instructions executed, memory read/write instructions
executed, exceptions taken, exceptions returned, software changes
of PC, branches executed, branches mis-predicted, external mem-
ory accesses, data memory accesses, and instruction cache accesses.
However, only a given number of events, e.g. only 4 for Cortex-A8,
can be read through the performance monitoring units at the same
time.
B. Details on LSTM and CRBM
We describe the detailed structures of LSTM, RBM and CRBM.
Figure 10 shows the inner structure of LSTM [4]. A basic LSTM
cell has three gates that control information flow. The three gates
are the forget gate ft , input gate it and output gate ot . ft controls
howmuch previous information remains in the memory. it controls
howmuch new information is stored in the memory, and ot controls
how much information flows to the output. We define xt as the
input vector. There are also two state vectors, i.e., cell vector ct and
output vector ht :
ft = σ (Wf xt +Uf ht−1 + bf ) (5)
it = σ (Wixt +Uiht−1 + bi ) (6)
ot = σ (Woxt +Uoht−1 + bo ) (7)
ct = ft . ∗ ct−1 + it . ∗ tanh(Wcxt +Ucht−1 + bc ) (8)
ht = ot . ∗ tanh(ct ) (9)
12
where .∗ is element-wise multiplication and σ is the sigmoid func-
tion.
Figure 10: LSTM layers[4]
Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is another generative neu-
ral network which is able to learn a probability distribution. Figure
11 left shows the basic structure of an RBM with m hidden units
and n visible units [14]. Both hidden and visible units can only take
values of zeros and ones. The probability of taken zeros and ones
are given by the following equations (H denotes hidden units and
V denotes visible units):
p(Hi = 1|v) = σ (
m∑
j=1
wi jvj + ci ) (10)
p(Vj = 1|h) = σ (
n∑
i=1
wi jhi + bj ) (11)
where σ is a sigmoid function. For RBM which takes real value
inputs, the model can be extended to:
p(Hi = 1|v) = σ (
m∑
j=1
wi jvj + ci ) (12)
p(Vj |h) = N (bi +
n∑
i=1
wi jhi , 1) (13)
where N (µ,σ ) is a Gaussian function. Contrastive Divergence
(CD) is a widely used approximation algorithm for training the
RBM [10].
However, the vanilla RBM does not consider any temporal in-
formation and thus is not feasible to be used as the predictor. Con-
ditional RBM (CRBM) [48] is an extension of the original RBM
by taking history information into consideration. Figure 11 right
shows the structure of a CRBM.
ai,t = ai +
∑
k
Akivk,<t (14)
bj,t = bj +
∑
k
Bk jvk,<t (15)
The effect of the history information on hidden units (and visible
units) can be viewed as a dynamic bias bj,t (ai,t ) instead of bj (ai )
in the above equations [49].
Figure 11: Left: The undirected graph of an RBMwithm hid-
den and n visible variables [14]. Right: Conditional-RBM in-
troduces history into RBM.
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